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Battered Wives Who Kill: Civil Liability and the
Admissibility of Battered Woman's
Syndrome Testimony
Jenae R. Bunyak*
I. The Crime: Mariticide
A man is found dead in a hotel room-shot by his wife. Six
weeks before the shooting, she had been hospitalized for injuries
from "unknown causes."1 After leaving the 'hospital, she went
back to live with her husband who then knocked her down, kicked
her and choked her into unconsciousness. The incident prompted
her to move into a motel. Her husband continued to harass her by
calling her day and night, threatening her life and the lives of her
family. She became so frightened that she began to carry a gun.
On the day she shot him, her husband had broken into her motel
room, hit her, choked her and threatened to kill her. He forced
her to shower with him while he roughly and violently shaved her
pubic hair, nicking and cutting her. Next, he forced her to have
sexual intercourse with him. Pounding a beer bottle on a night
stand, he threw a dollar at her and demanded that she go out and
buy him cigarettes. Instead, she went to her purse, pulled out a
gun and demanded that he leave. "You are dead, bitch, now," he
replied, and reached for his frequent weapon, the beer bottle. She
closed her eyes and fired.2
Betty Hundley killed her husband Carl, but only after he had
subjected her to ten years of abuse. He had knocked out several of
her teeth, broken her nose five times, threatened to cut her eye-
balls out and her head off, kicked her downstairs, and repeatedly
broken her ribs. Betty had diabetes, and Carl often prevented her
from taking her insulin by hiding it or diluting it with water. She
would then fall into diabetic comas.3
Although Betty's plight arouses sympathy, a jury convicted
* Jenae Bunyak will receive her J.D. from the University of Minnesota Law
School in 1987. She is currently a visiting student at Arizona State University Law
School.
1. State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 461, 693 P.2d 475, 476 (1985).
2. Id. at 461, 693 P.2d at 476.
3. Id.
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her of manslaughter. Judges, juries, and the media sometimes fear
that acquittals of battered women will result in an "open season"
on men 4 or that battered women may feel justified in killing
merely as a revenge for past abuse.5 This belief ignores the cumu-
lative effect of repeated beatings on the battered woman's reason-
able perceptions of her attacker and his intentions. 6 She knows
the danger she is in and responds with deadly force. This act dif-
fers from killing the batterer as a punishment for his past abuse of
her. The defense is self-defense, not that he deserved to die.
II. The Problem: Wife-Beaters
The term wife-beating is now included in the label of "domes-
tic or spouse abuse," although the vast majority of victims are wo-
men, not men.7 Husbands beat their wives by pushing, kicking,
slapping, dragging, stabbing and shooting them. They also throw
4. Jennifer Baker Fleming, Stopping Wife Abuse: A Guide to the Emotional,
Psychological, and Legal Implications for the Abused Woman and Those Helping
Her 236 (1979) (citing magazine articles that suggest that the women's movement
has precipitated an "open season on men"). See, e.g., The Right to Kill, Newsweek,
Sept. 1, 1975, at 69; A Killing Excuse, Time, Nov. 28, 1977, at 108. These articles
ignore the analogous "open season" on women that has always existed. Rape, wife-
beating, and pornography have been tormenting women throughout history.
5. See Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 997 (Wyo. 1984). In Jahnke an abused
male teenager waited in ambush for his father to return home from the movies.
When the father returned home, his son shot him. Since the trial court found there
were no circumstances showing an actual or threatened parental assault, it ruled
that the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct was not in issue. Accordingly,
the court refused to allow the hearsay testimony of a forensic psychiatrist regarding
the defendant's home life. The court rejected the defendant's argument that abuse
victims have a special defense:
Although many people, and the public media, seem to be prepared to
espouse the notion that a victim of abuse is entitled to kill the abuser
that special justification defense is antithetical to the mores of modern
civilized society .... To permit capital punishment to be imposed upon
the subjective conclusion of the individual that prior acts and conduct
of the deceased justified the killing would amount to a leap into the
abyss of anarchy.
Id. at 997.
6. Cf. Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 475 Pa. 297, 304, 380 A.2d 362, 366 (1977)
(citing with approval, Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286
(1972)), supporting the proposition that the trier of fact may rely on the "cumula-
tive impact of a series of related events in making the objective determination as to
what constitutes legally adequate provocation." 475 Pa. at 304; 380 A.2d at 366.
This murder appeal involved a mitigating provication defense rather than the com-
plete defense of self-defense, however, past experiences should be considered in
each type of case.
7. Susan Schechter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of
the Battered Women's Movement 214, 214 n.16 (1982) (citing Facts: A Focus on 'Bat-
tered Husbands,' Aegis: Magazine on Ending Violence Against Women, Jan.-Feb.
1979, at 21; the Layfayette, Louisiana Task Force on Domestic Violence found that
in 1976, 95% of the domestic violence calls to law enforcement agencies were from
women victims).
[Vol. 4:603
1986] BATTERED WIVES WHO KILL
objects at them and burn them with cigarettes. Battering husbands
may also sexually abuse their wives by forcing them to have sex
with them or with other men, women or animals. It is estimated
that violence occurs in about thirteen to sixteen percent of all
marriages.8 The problem is not limited to husbands and wives.
Unmarried men also beat the unmarried women with whom they
are intimate.
An increasing number of courts are admitting expert testi-
mony regarding the battered woman's syndrome (BWS).9 While
the purpose of the testimony is only to supplement the self-de-
fense claim,10 it is sometimes erroneously thought of as a defense
in itself.l" BWS evidence does not give a battered woman a license
to kill.12 Rather, the admission of BWS evidence acknowledges
her right to protect herself from serious bodily injury or death.'3
While the admissibility of expert testimony regarding bat-
tered woman's syndrome may result in an increased number of ac-
quittals, the battered woman may still be subject to civil liability.14
A criminal action does not preclude a subsequent wrongful death
action. In Betty Hundley's case, the Kansas Supreme Court re-
versed the manslaughter conviction and remanded Hundley for a
new trial. On remand, expert testimony will be admissible to
prove the nature and effect of wife beating.15 Neither another con-
viction nor a subsequent acquittal will prevent a wrongful death
action.16
8. Susan Atkins & Brenda Hoggett, Women and the Law 124-25 (1984).
9. Hawthorne v. State, 470 So. 2d 770, 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). See Phyl-
lis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in
Self-Defense, 8 Harv. Women's L.J. 121, 138 n.77 (1985) for a listing of courts consid-
ering admissibility of battered woman's syndrome testimony.
10. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 819-20 (N.D. 1983). See also Elizabeth
Bochnak, Case Preparation and Development in Women's Self-Defense Cases 42-43
n.76 (1981).
11. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 819-20; Bochnak, supra note 10, at 43-44; Michael
Buda & Teresa Butler, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on Do-
mestic Violence, 23 J. Farn. L. 359, 373 n.101 (1985).
12. Bochnak, supra note 10, at 42; State v. Kelly, 33 Wash. App. 541, 544, 655
P.2d 1202, 1203 (1982) ("The existence of the syndrome in a marriage does not of
itself establish the legal right of the wife to kill the husband, the evidence must
still be considered in the context of self-defense") (footnote omitted).
13. Kelly, 33 Wash. App. at 544, 655 P.2d at 1203.
14. See Morrison v. Bradley, 622 P.2d 81 (Colo. App. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 655 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982) (wrongful death action brought by son and
daughter of decedent against defendant, the decedent's girlfriend; battered woman's
syndrome not accepted as a defense to a wrongful death action based on
negligence).
15. State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 467-68, 963 P.2d 475, 477 (1985).
16. See Stevens v. Stevens, 231 Kan. 726, 727-28, 647 P.2d 1346, 1347-48 (1982)
(Stepchildren brought a wrongful death action against the stepmother for the death
of their father. The stepmother claimed the shooting was accidental, but she was
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The motivation to bring suit against a battered wife for kill-
ing her husband is varied. Upset relatives may pressure a personal
respresentative to bring suit. Such relatives of the decedent may
not have known he was a wife-beater, or if they did know, they
may accuse the woman of being a vigilante. The relatives may not
believe that she killed in self-defense. If the decedent was a well-
respected man in the community whose wifebeating was unknown
outside the immediate family, relatives may wish to lessen the em-
barrassment and seek to blame the wife to "save the family name."
Wife abuse cuts across class linesI7 and thus if the decedent had
money, although relatives may be reluctant to see the wife go to
jail, they may not be so reluctant to see that she does not get life
insurance proceedsl8 or the benefit of the estate.
Some states have laws, termed "slayer statutes," which pre-
vent the spouse who killed the other from inheriting his estate. 19
In other states, the slayer is allowed to inherit, but any property
will be placed in a constructive trust.20 In many states, however,
the slayer is allowed to directly inherit the estate.2 1 If the wife
convicted of involuntary manslaughter nonetheless. The conviction did not bar the
subsequent wrongful death action).
17. See, e.g., Laura Elliott, Shattered Dreams, The Washingtonian, Apr. 1986, at
100. John Fedders, chief of enforcement for the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, was a man who had it all-not only money, fame and power, but a terrible
temper as well. His exposure as a wife-beater during his divorce proceedings forced
him to resign his position. Despite the pattern of abuse, Charlotte Fedders contin-
ued to be pressured to make the marriage work. Even though the divorce judge
heard testimony on the abuse, he nonetheless called the couple's lawyers into his
chambers and "strongly suggested an attempt at reconciliation." Id.
18. Most states do not have general statutes governing the rights of life insur-
ance beneficiaries nor specific statutes dealing with a slaying beneficiary. Courts
are split on whether or not a claimant acquitted of criminal charges is disqualified
from receiving proceeds. See, e.g., State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am. v. Hamp-
ton, 696 P.2d 1027, 1034 (Okla. 1985). In this action, the wife sued the administrator
of the estate for life insurance proceeds. The court held that the "slayer" wife's
acquittal did not automatically entitle her to deceased husband's insurance pro-
ceeds. Instead, the issue of whether the killing was intentional or unjustified could
be relitigated in the civil action for life insurance proceeds. Under the policy, she
could not collect if the killing was felonious, intentional, or unjustified. Cf. Com-
mercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1966) (The wife
was previously convicted of involuntary manslaughter of her husband, but was not
barred from recovering under deceased husband's policy); Moore v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 342 Pa. 570, 576, 21 A.2d 42, 45 (1941) (Although the wife was serving a sentence
for voluntary manslaughter, she was allowed to recover life insurance proceeds as
administratrix of her husband's estate. The court held that if she did indirectly re-
ceive part of the proceeds through inheritance, it was permissible because the Intes-
tate Act allowed it).
19. John Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statu-
tory Solution, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 715, 715 n.1 (1936).
20. Page on Wills § 17.19 p. 847 (Bowe-Parker Revision 1960 & Supp. 1986).
21. See Campbell v. Ray, 102 N.J. Super. 235, 245 A.2d 761 (1968) (spouse who
was found to be insane when she murdered her husband entitled to life insurance
BATTERED WIVES WHO KILL
can prove self-defense she will be able to take what she is thereby
entitled to.22 Even when convicted of the voluntary manslaughter
of her husband, an Idaho wife was entitled to inherit his intestate
estate because there was no legislative declaration to the con-
trary.23 If the battered wife lives in a jurisdiction with no slayer
statute, and she is allowed to inherit her husband's estate, she will
then have assets providing an incentive to bring a wrongful death
action against her. Children of a prior marriage may also want to
bring a wrongful death action, especially if they are adults and
stand either to gain estate assets through a damage judgment or to
inherit the estate if such an action is used by the probate court to
forfeit the wife's share.24
A. Interspousal Tort Immunity
Whether a wrongful death action can be brought depends
upon whether the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity is fol-
lowed in the particular jurisdiction. Interspousal tort immunity is
based on the legal fiction that a married couple becomes one per-
son in the eyes of the law.25 The "one person," however, is the
man. Married women have no capacity to sue or be sued without
proceeds because recovery was not against public policy); Anstine v. Hawkins, 92
Idaho 651, 447 P.2d 677 (1968) (absent contrary legislative intent, wife convicted of
manslaughter entitled to inherit the intestate estate of her deceased husband); In re
Wirth, 59 Misc. 2d 300, 298 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1969) (husband acquitted of wife's murder
on insanity grounds given his share of spouse's intestate estate).
22. See Ovalle v. Ovalle, 604 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Ward v. Ward,
174 Va. 331, 6 S.E.2d 664 (1940); Floyd v. Franklin, 251 Ala. 15, 36 So. 2d 234 (1948).
23. Anstine v. Hawkins, 92 Idaho 561, 447 P.2d 677 (1968). Accord In re Seipel,
29 Ill. App. 3d 71, 329 N.E.2d 419 (1975) (wife convicted of involuntary manslaughter
not statutorily barred from inheritance); cf Conner v. Holbert, 49 Tenn. App. 319,
354 S.W.2d 809 (1961) (husband convicted of voluntary manslaughter of his wife
barred by statute from inheritance of property).
24. See, e.g., Morrison v. Bradley, 622 P.2d 81 (Colo. App. 1980). The defendant
had killed her abusive boyfriend. His son and daughter then brought a wrongful
death action against her for damages. She alleged negligence of the deceased. A
jury found the deceased 40% negligent and the defendant 60% negligent. The de-
fendant testified that the deceased had struck or threatened her at various times
the last two years and had severely beaten her the day before the shooting. On the
day of the shooting, the deceased had struck her on the chin with his fist which
caused her to "stagger from the office." Id. at 82. She returned with a gun and
shot him. A psychologist testified as to the emotional state of the defendant, the
causes of her condition, and the role of the batterer. The court said the thrust of
the woman's case was that her actions resulted from being a battered woman. The
court believed this "theory" was offered as a defense in the wrongful death action
and stated: "We neither accept nor reject the validity of the general theory. How-
ever, insofar as it would require a change in the rules of evidence in a wrongful
death action based on negligence, we decline to apply it in this case." Id.
25. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. 1977).
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joinder of the husband.26 He becomes liable for his wife's torts.27
Under the interspousal immunity doctrine, one spouse does
not have a cause of action against the other.28 Such immunity is
thought to preserve domestic harmony and avoid collusive or frivo-
lous claims.29 Criminal or divorce proceedings are to be alterna-
tives to tort actions.3 0 Law enforcement officers' refusal to
consider wife beating a crime, however, renders the criminal rem-
edy useless.3 1 Neither is divorce a realistic remedy. Not only is it
disapproved, but usually the woman only wants the beatings, not
the marriage, to end.32 Divorce proceedings will remove her from
the battering situation, but this does not remedy the physical in-
jury. Divorce as a remedy condones wife-beating by implying that
a man cannot change his behavior.33 The wife-beater's "punish-
ment" is merely the loss of his wife. Once divorced, the man is
free to remarry and beat his new wife. Society has not told him
that his behavior was wrong; it merely tells him that one woman
(his ex-wife) was not willing to tolerate it. He simply needs to find
someone else.
This ineffective form of punishment for wife-beating is incon-
sistent with the purpose of the criminal justice system. A mur-




29. James Russell Wells, Torts-Interspousal Immunity-Unliquidated Tort
Claims Between Spouses No Longer Barred, Pennsylvania Abrogates Doctrine of In-
terspousal Tort Immunity as Unsupported by Law, Logic or Public Policy, 27 Vill.
L. Rev. 432, 446 n.65 (1982).
30. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 244, 462 A.2d 506, 508 (Md. 1983). See also
Roger Langley & Richard C. Levy, Wife Beating: The Silent Crisis 56 (1977) (citing
Robert Calvert, Criminal and Civil Liability in Husband-Wife Assaults 88-90 (Su-
zanne K. Steinmetz & Murray A. Straus ed. 1974)).
31. Langley & Levy, supra note 30, at 56 (quoting People v. Jones, 191 Cal.
App. 2d 478, 482, 12 Cal. Rptr. 777, 780 (1961)). An abused woman carried a gun to
defend herself from her husband and shot and killed him. Under California law, it
was a justifiable homicide to kill someone while resisting a felony. Nonetheless she
was convicted. The court said, "[I1n creating the statutory felony of wife-beating
the purpose of the legislation was not to issue a license for a wife to kill her hus-
band but to provide a means of dealing with a particular family situation." 191 Cal.
App. 2d at 482, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 780. Note how wife-beating becomes a mere "family
situation," not really a crime.
32. Langley & Levy, supra note 30, at 128. One woman said, "I loved him, and
it took me thirty years to get over it. I knew in 1964 I didn't need him, but I
couldn't get over wanting him. He beat me, he knocked me around ever since we
were married, but I still loved him." Id. at 128.
33. Id at 184. Insensitivity to a battered woman's situation is shown by the
common attitude that termination of the marriage, not punishment of the batterer,
is the solution. The authors tell of one family court judge who refused to issue a
warrant to a battered woman. His comment was, "Any woman dumb enough to
marry such a jerk deserves what she gets." Id. at 184.
[Vol. 4:603
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has a strong interest in preventing him from repeating his crime.
Suitable punishment demands loss of liberty.
Interspousal tort immunity persists in our legal system under
the rationale of preserving family harmony, although based on the
now-rejected legal fiction that the man and woman are one.34 "A
man's home is his castle" implies that the kingdom of the family is
beyond the interference of the law.35 The law, however, does se-
lectively interfere. It sets minimum age requirements, prohibits
marriage between close relatives, and specifies how marriages may
be dissolved. What the law prefers to ignore, however, is what
goes on behind closed doors. What a man does to his wife is con-
sidered none of the state's business. 36
This selective ignorance stems from the belief that a husband
should have control over his wife.3 7 Interfering with this control
weakens the family unit much as a nation is weakened if the gov-
ernment loses control of its citizens.38 As a result, when police of-
ficers are called to respond to a domestic "dispute," they often feel
as though they are invading another man's domain and interfering
with his "legitimate" control over his wife.39 Police are most often
instructed to use crisis intervention techniques to calm the parties
down.40 They then leave. The reluctance or refusal to arrest the
34. See Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 1982) (the court supported inter-
spousal tort immunity in an intentional tort action, stating, "Protection of the fam-
ily unit is a significant public policy and we are greatly concerned by any intrusion
that adversely affects the family relationship or the family resources").
35. Louise Armstrong, The Home Front: Notes from the Family War Zone 74
(1983).
36. Schechter, supra note 7, at 158 (citing James Bannon, "Law Enforcement
Problems with Intra-Family Violence," Reprinted by American Friends Service
Committee, Women's Issues Program 1 (undated)) (domestic violence considered a
"personal problem").
37. See Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 243, 462 A.2d 506, 507 (1983). The court
termed interspousal immunity as "a rule in derogation of married women." The
court commented that the woman "became subservient to [the husband's] will and
fitted with a distasteful yoke of servitude and compelled obeisance that was galling
at best and crushing at worst." Id. See also Schechter, supra note 7, at 218-24.
38. See Susan Edwards, Male Violence Against 14omen Excusatory and Ex-
planatory Ideologies in Law and Society in Gender, Sex and the Law 183, 189-90
(citing Blackstone's Commentaries):
[W]e [must] recollect that if the feme kills her baron, it is regarded by
the law as a much more atrocious crime as she not only breaks
through the restraints of humanity and conjugal affection, but throws
off all subjection to the authority of her husband. And therefore the
law denominated her crime a species of treason, and condemns her to
the same punishment as if she had killed the king.
Id. at 189-90.
39. See generally Maria K. Pastoor, Police Training and the Effectiveness of
Minnesota "Domestic Abuse" Laws, 2 Law & Inequality 557, 559-64 (1984).
40. See generally Del Martin, Battered Wives 92-94 (1981); see also Pastoor,
supra note 39, at 586-89 (discussing police policy and procedure).
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batterer may communicate to the batterer that what has happened
is not serious and will not be punished.41
Intrinsic in the concept of control is the right to discipline.
Since society gives men the right to discipline their wives and chil-
dren, wife-beating is perceived as a husband disciplining his wife.42
Many people believe there must be "some reason" for the beating.
Women who stay with batterers are thought to be masochistic.43
Why is it that men who beat women are not considered sadistic?
Instead, society focuses on the woman and asks, "why does she put
up with it if she doesn't like it?" rather than "why does he beat
her when she doesn't like it?"
If there is no reason for the beatings, they must be treated as
unjustifiable, and the woman should be given the same rights as
any other citizen. If the right-to-discipline attitude prevails, then
the purported reasons for the beatings justify the disciplinary ac-
tions. The husband often thinks his wife should be his servant. If
dinner is late or the house is a mess, he believes he has the right to
exercise his control and punish her. But does society really believe
she deserves to be beaten for these reasons? If the answer is
"yes," then severity of the abuse, short of inflicting death, is a mat-
ter of discretion left to the man and not subject to review by the
law. Interference with this right will only irritate the male and
worsen the female's plight.44 If the husband's right to beat his
wife is presumed, then society's only remedy is to remove her from
the environment of violence.
If wife beating were considered criminal, the situation would
be treated as other criminal actions. The criminal would be re-
moved from the victim and potential victims (other members of so-
ciety). No one would seriously suggest that vulnerable members of
society be taken away and locked up so they cannot be victimized.
Yet that is what happens to battered wives who are victims of
abuse from their husbands. The responsibility is on them to "es-
cape," not on the batterer to either stop his behavior or be incar-
cerated for it. The emphasis on "preserving the family" is not
valid when the husband destroys the harmony of his family by us-
ing unjustified force.45
41. Nancy Loving, Responding to Spouse Abuse and Wife Beating- A Guide for
Police 61 (1980).
42. See generally Schechter, supra note 7, at 209-40.
43. Battered Women 20 (Donna M. Moore ed. 1979).
44. Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman 96 (1979). Walker writes: "Police
often advise a woman not to file a complaint: 'Ma'am, if you do that, you'll never
survive it.' Abuse is punishable. On paper." Id. at 96.
45. See Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 562, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343 (W.
[Vol. 4:603
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B. Battered Woman's Syndrome
Women who experience physical and emotional abuse in an
intimate relationship over an extended period of time develop psy-
chological characteristics identified by psychologists as battered
woman's syndrome. 46 The typical battering cycle consists of three
phases. In phase one, "the tension-building stage," the battering
male engages in minor battering incidents and verbal abuse, while
the woman, fearful and tense, tries to be placating and passive in
order to prevent more serious violence.47
Phase two is the "acute battering stage" during which the
male beats the woman more frequently and more severely. The
triggering event that initiates this stage is most often an internal
or external event in the batterer's life, but the woman who can no
longer tolerate or control her phase-one anger and anxiety may
deliberately provoke him in order to reach phase three.48 The wo-
man's sense of powerlessness against him results in "learned help-
lessness,"49 because she cannot predict or control the violence.5o
Numbed by fear, she may be unable to think clearly about the
means to escape because she is more concerned with day-to-day
survival.5 1 Her emotional paralysis is reinforced by her traditional
beliefs about the sanctity of the home and family and false hope
that things will improve.5 2
False hope stems from phase three, which is a temporary lull
in the physical abuse. During this phase, the batterer may plead
for forgiveness and demonstrate very loving behavior.53 He may
promise to seek professional help, to stop drinking, and to refrain
Va. 1978). The court rejected interspousal tort immunity as a defense in an inten-
tional assault action:
Our law before today practiced a cruel paradox. Under the guise of
promoting family harmony, it permitted the wife beater to practice his
twisted frustrations secure in the knowledge that he was immune
from civil action, except for a divorce, and that any criminal penalty
would ordinarily be a modest fine. If nothing else, the knowledge of a
monetary judgment with punitive damages may stay such violence.
Id. at 562, 244 S.E.2d at 343-44.
46. People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 133, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (1985).
47. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 193, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (1984). See also State v.
Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 594, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (1984) (citing Lenore Walker, The
Battered Woman 56-59 (1979)).
48. Kelly, 97 N.J. at 193, 478 A.2d at 371.
49. State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 594, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (1984).
50. People v. Torres, 128 Misc. at 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
51. Roberta K. Thyfault, Sef-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial, 20
Ca. W.L. Rev. 485, 490 (1984).
52. Id
53. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 193-94, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (1984).
1986]
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from further violence.54 For some couples, this period of relative
calm may last several months, but then the contrition and affec-
tion fade, and phase one starts again.55 The length of phase three
tends to decrease the longer the relationship lasts.56
1. Why she stays.
The natural response to the battered woman's plight is to ask
why she stays. This question blames the victim for her situation.
It takes the man's battering behavior as a given-something men
do-and if women do not like it they must simply leave. Instead,
what society should ask is: "Why does a 'normal' man find it neces-
sary to beat his wife?" Of all the people with whom he interacts,
he only beats her. The answer to this latter question is an un-
pleasant reality. He beats his wife because there is no penalty for
doing so. He does not beat others because he would be punished if
he did. The law has given him a human punching bag to vent his
frustrations upon.
If a battered woman does leave, the man often pursues her.57
The cases are replete with accounts of men who, although under
court order to leave the woman alone, persist in tracking her
down, cross-country if necessary, to find and beat her.58 Her act
of leaving very often precipitates heightened violence,59 thus mak-
ing the battered woman all the more fearful for her safety.
A battered woman remains in an abusive relationship for any
54. Id at 194, 478 A.2d at 371.
55. Id
56. Thyfault, supra note 51, at 488.
57. Martin, supra note 40, at 77-79. A woman divorced for three years wrote
the following to a woman's group:
In every place where I have lived, my house has been watched so
closely by my ex-husband that I have been endlessly followed and re-
lentlessly pursued .... Two weeks ago he cornered me in the drug-
store. He repeatedly and very forcefully threatened my life in front of
a dozen witnesses. When I finally escaped his grasp, I ran home. I
called the police, but they didn't come. I'm afraid to leave the house
.... Yesterday my husband parked his car in front of my home for six
hours. I don't know what to do. My life is in jeopardy.
Id. at 79.
58. See Ann Jones, Women Who Kill 298-99 (1980). The author writes of Patri-
cia Gross's husband, who tracked her from Michigan to Mississippi and then
threatened to kill her relatives, thus forcing her to return to him. Judy Austin's
live-in boyfriend chased her from California to Arizona to Wyoming.
59. See State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984) (after the husband
was served with restraining orders and divorce proceedings were initiated, he broke
into her house and threatened to kill her); State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 693 P.2d
475 (1985) (the husband found and followed the wife to the hotel where she was
staying); Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (the wife moved
into her mother's house, but her husband pursued her and threatened to shoot her.
When she moved into an apartment, he broke in several times and beat her).
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number of reasons. Society encourages people to get married and
to stay married.6 0 She may not want to admit having "failed" at
marriage, especially if it is her second one.61 She may be embar-
rassed to admit to physical and sexual abuse.6 2 She may feel a
need to keep up appearances so her peers do not find out she is a
battered wife.63 Many battered women feel they are somehow to
blame, and the fact that they were beaten shows there is some-
thing wrong with them.64 She may feel that he won't get upset if
she keeps the environment stress-free. If she "tries harder," then
things will get better.6 5 She may love him (when he does not beat
her) and want to stay with him.66 The woman may feel she is the
man's property, and he has a right to "punish" her.67 She may not
want to ruin his career by exposing his brutal actions.68 She may
feel helpless and unable to make decisions.69 She may hope the
60. Martin, supra note 40, at 81. The author tells of one woman who felt com-
pelled to stay married: "I didn't think I had the right to talk about it. You just
didn't let anyone else know about anything [i.e. battering] like that. There had
never been a divorce in our family. No one ever admitted that there was anything
wrong in their marriage." Id. at 81.
61. Id. Martin writes, "Women in our culture are encouraged to believe that
the failure of a marriage represents their failure as women." Id. at 81.
62. Langley & Levy, supra note 30, at 128.
63. Terry Davidson, Conjugal Crime: Understanding and Changing the
Wifebeating Pattern 131-54 (1978). The author tells of her father, a Christian min-
ister, who beat her mother consistently throughout their marriage. Her mother
never told any outsiders of the violence at home.
64. Elizabeth Stanko, Intimate Intrusions: Women's Experience of Male Vio-
lence 55-56 (1985). One woman wrote, "The feeling of helplessness due to the fact
that it was my fault that I got battered, which I think is common that a woman is
blamed because she provoked him. Certainly my husband immediately blamed me.
'If you had done so and so; if you hadn't done so and so.'" Id. at 56.
65. Id. at 58. Another woman wrote: "[I returned to my husband] because I was
sure there was something in me that could make the marriage work. I was quite
positive about that." Id. at 58-59.
66. Battered Women, supra note 43, at 23. See also Walker, supra note 44, at
65-66. Walker writes of women who soon after the acute battering incident went
from being "lonely, angry, frightened, and hurt to being happy, confident, and lov-
ing." Walker, supra note 44, at 66. During the final phase of the cycle theory, the
loving-contrition phase, the husband behaves in a charming, loving manner, begging
for forgiveness and promising never to hurt her again.
67. Langley & Levy, supra note 30, at 127. The authors quote Dr. Gelles:
Our research on marital violence suggests that many victims of family
violence do not view these acts as violence or as problems. Women
who have been beaten severely by their husbands often state that they
"deserved to be hit," that they "needed to be hit" or that "husbands
are supposed to hit their wives."
Id.
68. Davidson, supra note 63, at 148. The author tells of a statement her mother
had put in a safe deposit box in case her father ever got too violent. The last sen-
tence was: "The reason I did not leave my husband was that I realized that if the
truth were known, it would mean the end of his ministry." Id.
69. See Battered Women, supra note 43, at 24.
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man will change, especially if he promises never to beat her
again.70 If the shelters for battered women are full or if she does
not have the economic resources, then she may have no place to
go. 7 ' If children are involved, she may not be able to get out safely
with them or she may be unable to find a shelter with enough
space for all of them.72 Finally, she may fear reprisal from her
husband if she does leave.
7 3
2. Psychological reactions.
The woman's learned helplessness may lead to a feeling of
surrender where she becomes unable to recognize the avenues of
escape.7 4 In addition, she may experience frustration, stress disor-
ders, depression, low self-esteem, and the isolating effect of losing
contact with family and friends. 7 5 They may not believe she is ac-
tually being beaten or they may feel embarrassed or uncomforta-
ble around her. They may not wish to "interfere."7 6 Some women
may perceive the battering cycle as normal, especially if they grew
up in a violent household.77 Others may not want to admit the re-
ality of their situation.78 A woman who becomes demoralized and
fearful may believe her husband is omnipotent, and any action on
her part against him would be futile.
7 9
70. Walker, supra note 44, at 129. Walker says that economics can trap women
in a relationship in two ways. One is by her fear of becoming poor, and the other is
by the use of money as a coercive weapon. In the latter case, women may be either
dependent on their husband's income or if they have their own income it is usually
spent to support their families.
71. Langley & Levy, supra note 30, at 133.
72. I& at 134-35. The authors note that very few shelters have group accommo-
dations for a family. If the battered woman leaves without the children, she may
lose them for "failing to provide for them." Id.
73. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 195, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (1984).
74. State v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 190, 685 P.2d 564, 567 (1984) (testimony
from expert witness for petitioner, Ms. Kelly, concerning the battered woman
syndrome).
75. Id.
76. Martin, supra note 40, at 18. Martin tells of a feminist friend in Oakland,
California, who witnessed a street fight in which a husband was hitting his preg-
nant wife in the stomach. When she tried to intervene, the male bystanders who
stood by watching shouted at her, "You can't do that! She's his wife!" and "You
shouldn't interfere; it's none of your business." Id.
77. See Richard J. Gelles, No Place to Go: The Social Dynamics of Marital Vio-
lence, in Battered Women, A Psychosociological Study of Domestic Violence 60
(Maria Roy ed. 1977). See also Martin, supra note 40, at 79.
78. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. at 194, 478 A.2d at 372 (citing Davidson, supra note
63, at 50).
79. Martin, supra note 40, at 78-79. "It is the fear of knowing someone is
searching for you and will beat you when he finds you. In the mind of someone
who has been badly beaten this fear blots out all reason. The man seems to be om-
nipotent." Id.
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3. Special perception develops.
Because of her situation, the battered woman becomes very
attuned to the emotional and physical signs her batterer displays
before the periods of violence.8 0 She learns to distinguish subtle
changes in his tone of voice and facial expression.81 Unlike the sit-
uation where someone is attacked by a stranger, the battered wo-
man is in a better position to know if and when the batterer will
act on his threat.8 2 She has lived with him and observed his man-
nerisms. She has learned to read his moods. Her experiences with
the batterer influence her perceptions when he beats her, so that
she may not only focus on what is presently occurring, but also on
the potential harm she knows he is capable of inflicting upon her
at some future time.8 3 Her thoughts are only to protect herself
from that harm. She believes she has only two choices: she can ac-
tively strike back or passively submit to an intolerable existence in
which she risks death.84
III. One Response: Homicide
Killings by battered women are often considered "preventive
strikes."8 5 A preventive strike is one done to prevent anticipated
harm. Anticipated harm, however, does not necessarily mean im-
minent harm. Self-defense is a complete defense to a homicide if
it is in response to imminent danger. Thus, although a woman may
have suffered from years of abuse, at some point she may fear that
instead of "simply" beating her, the assaultive male actually means
to kill her.8 6
This is a realistic fear. In 1984 alone, 18% of all murders na-
tionwide involved family relationships.8" Forty-eight percent of
80. Bochnak, supra note 10, at 45 n.5.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Thyfault, supra note 51, at 494-95.
84. Doris Del Tosto, Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 26 Vill. L. Rev. 105, 112 (1980).
85. Jones, supra note 58, at 288.
86. See Borders v. State, 433 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The
woman tried to prevent her battering husband from re-entering the house. She had
armed herself with a kitchen knife, and her husband said, "I see that knife. I ain't
scared of that knife. You don't have as much strength as I have." Id. at 1326. See
also State v. Branchal, 684 P.2d 1163 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984). Defendant stated:
I was thinking that I didn't want to kill him. I just wanted to get him
scared like he used to get me scared. But it didn't work out. He just
showed anger and more anger. That's when I figured that if I didn't
shoot at him he was either gonna kill me, take the gun away from me
or kill one of the kids, or kill me, or something.
Id. at 1166.




the murders were spouse killing spouse, and of these, 62% were
husbands killing wives.88 When a woman kills her husband in his
sleep because she fears that when he wakes up, he will kill her,
she will most likely be charged with first-degree murder.8 9 Histori-
cally, women who killed their husbands pled temporary insanity
or diminished capacity.90 Society viewed their action as a "solu-
tion" to the problem of a battering husband. That a woman would
kill her husband to save her own life was incomprehensible. The
law ignored wife-beating, and when the abuse could not be ig-
nored, it was tolerated.91 The preventive strike tactic did not fit
within the normally recognized confines of the self-defense justifi-
cation, even though the next time he threatened her, she may
have been defenseless, and he would have been able to kill her.92
In the Hundley case, discussed in the beginning of this arti-
cle, the prosecution attempted to rebut the use of self-defense by
showing that Carl was unarmed, and his attention had been di-
rected toward the beer bottle when Betty shot him. She was also
not physically blocked from going to the door. The evidence
showed, however, that he had beaten her with beer bottles
before.93 After he threatened her life and refused to leave, his
reaching for the beer bottle caused her to fear for her life. Betty's
belief that she faced death or great bodily harm was a reasonable
one under the circumstances.
The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed, and held that a self-
defense instruction stating that the harm must be "immediate"
was reversible error. Remanding the Hundley case, the court said:
[Tihe use of the word "immediate"... places undue emphasis
on the immediate action of the deceased, and obliterates the
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., People v. Powell, 102 Misc. 2d 775, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1980); State v.
Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983); People v. Giacalone, 242 Mich. 16,
217 N.W. 758 (1928).
90. Bochnak, supra note 10, at 29.
91. Langley & Levy, supra note 30, at 53 (quoting Bradley v. State, 1 Miss (1
Walker) 156, 158 (1824). The Mississippi Supreme Court held that a husband
should be permitted to "moderately chastise his wife without subjecting himself to
vexatious prosecutions for assault and battery, resulting in the discredit and shame
of all parties concerned"). Id. at 158.
92. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. at 220 n.23, 478 A.2d at 385 n.23; See generally
Crocker, supra note 9, at 139-42. Accord McMorris v. State, 58 Wisc. 2d 144, 150, 205
N.W.2d 559, 562 (1973). The court said:
[W]here there is a sufficient factual basis to raise the issue of self-de-
fense, and the turbulent and violent character of the victim is an es-
sential element of the defense, proof should be admitted as to both the
reputation of the victim and the defendant's personal knowledge of
prior relevant conduct of the victim.
Id. at 562.
93. State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 462, 693 P.2d 475, 476 (1985).
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nature of the buildup of terror and fear which had been sys-
tematically created over a long period of time. "Imminent" de-
scribes the situation more accurately .... [T]he law of self-
defense recognizes one may reasonably fear danger but be
mistaken.94
IV. The Defense: Self-Defense
If the civil wrongful death action is allowed against women
who kill their batterers, then the battered woman will have a de-
fense if she killed in self-defense. Criminal law usually supplies
the context for self-defense, but it is also applicable in tort actions.
Conduct otherwise classified as tortious battery may be justified as
self-defense or defense of others.9 5 When the defensive conduct is
justified, no civil liability attaches.9 6
Self-defense involves two concepts. The first concept is that
only equal force should be used in response to the threatening
force.9 7 The second concept is that the person claiming self-de-
fense has a reasonable apprehension of the danger and a reason-
able perception of its imminence.98
While the law of self-defense varies from jurisdiction to juris-
diction, there are two main standards. The majority view is an ob-
jective standard: whether a reasonable man would have believed
himself to be in imminent danger.9 9 The minority view is a subjec-
tive standard: whether the defendant believed himself to be in im-
minent danger.10o Many jurisdictions require the belief to be both
honest and reasonable1 0 1
While in theory the objective standard seems fair, often it
does not work for battered women because the "reasonable man"
ideal does not take into account the inherent sex bias.102 The "rea-
94. 1& at 463, 693 P.2d at 477.
95. Duplechain v. Turner, 444 So. 2d 1322, 1325 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
96. Id.
97. Bochnak, supra note 10, at 17.
98. Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who
Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault in Women's Self-De-
fense Cases 16 (Elizabeth Bochnak ed. 1981).
99. Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Handbook on Criminal Law 391,
393-94 (1972).
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 199, 478 A.2d 364, 374 (1984). In New
Jersey, a proposed Code of Criminal Justice would have eliminated the reasonable-
ness requirement, and allowed self-defense whenever the defendant honestly be-
lieved in the imminent need to act. However, the proposed change was not
accepted by the Legislature. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:3-4 (1985) as finally enacted re-
tained the "reasonable" requirement.
102. Crocker, supra note 9, at 128 n.33.
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sonable man" is based on male models and expectations.10 3 It ig-
nores differences in social upbringing, physical size and strength,
and that a woman's perceptions of danger may differ from a
mans.O4
If a woman shoots an unarmed man, it appears that she used
deadly force against non-deadly force. 0 5 The "reasonable man"
standard, however, fails to take into account that a man is capable
of beating a woman to death with his bare hands or inflicting pain
by cruel means.'0 6 Moreover, women are less likely to have had
any type of defense training and more likely to be of slighter
build.107 Her batterer may be stronger, faster, and more violent
than she. Often the only weapon available to her will be a knife or
gun. While she may intend to use these weapons only to scare him
off, it often only makes the batterer more violent, since he may
not really believe she will actually use it.108 When she fails to
frighten him and he advances, her only choice is to use the
weapon. 109
103. Id. at 152 (citing Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and
the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 Signs 635, 636 (1983)).
104. Crocker, supra note 9, at 127.
105. See State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 461-63, 693 P.2d 475, 475-77 (1985). If she
were in a jurisdiction which imposes a duty to retreat or has an objective standard
which only takes into account the immediate event of the shooting, then she would
have a difficult time proving she shot in self-defense. The battered woman suffers a
great injustice by a legal system which imposes unrealistic standards on the situa-
tion of battered women. A "reasonable" man may have a gun and be able to suc-
cessfully scare another into retreating, however, a "reasonable" woman with a gun
will not only fail to frighten the man, but accentuates the violence toward her by
challenging his authority.
106. Id.
107. Schneider & Jordan, supra note 98, at 18; Susan Brownmiller, Against Our
Will 360 (1975). Brownmiller writes:
According to the odds, she is three inches shorter and 24 pounds
lighter than her male assailant. This works to her disadvantage psy-
chologically as well as physically, but worse than the difference in size
is the lifelong difference in mental attitude toward strength. He has
been encouraged from childhood to build his muscles and toughen his
fists. She has been encouraged to value soft skin, her slender wrist,
her smooth, unmuscled thigh and leg. His clothing gives him maxi-
mum mobility. His shoes are sturdy; thick heels give him power. Her
clothing hampers free movement by design, and fragile materials add
to her vulnerability.
Id. at 360-61.
108. See Borders v. State, 433 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); see also State
v. Branchal, 684 P.2d 1163 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
109. See State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E. 2d 137, 140 (1981); see
also May v. State, 460 So. 2d 778, 780 (Miss. 1984). Seventy-year-old decedent, who
drank a fifth of whiskey a day, and who had threatened to kill his fifty-two year old
wife in the past, struggled with her, chased her, and threatened her. Fearful of be-
ing severely beaten with a walking stick, she first fired warning shots. When this
failed to stop the angry man's advances, she shot him. Her manslaughter conviction
was confirmed on appeal.
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Nevertheless, some courts have rejected the use of battered
woman's syndrome (BWS) to prove the reasonableness of the de-
fendant's belief. The peculiarities of a particular defendant's
psyche are irrelevant if the standard is objective."l0 The court will
determine reasonableness by viewing only the facts as they ap-
peared at the time of the killing."'
Even reasonable people, however, will be affected by their
knowlege of the attacker's behavior and violent tendencies. The
error in disregarding any past violence by the batterer as irrele-
vant is that the battered woman's past experiences with him con-
tribute to her belief that the danger is imminent. Under the
objective standard, a "reasonable" male who knows his assailant is
especially violent would take this knowledge into account in a sub-
sequent assault situation.1i 2 Knowledge is interwoven with per-
ception; the two should not be separated. Thus, the objective
standard should not preclude taking the batterer's past violence
into account when assessing the "reasonableness" of the battered
woman's belief that her life is in danger.
Unlike victims in other assault situations, the battered wo-
man may be blamed for being in a battering relationship. 1 3 Thus,
the battered woman, by staying with an abusive partner, appears
to have willingly placed herself in an assaultive situation."14 If she
has been in the relationship for some time, a jury may not under-
stand why she killed him this time when she survived the other
beatings.ii 5
110. Del Tosto, supra note 84, at 123.
111. Ik
112. See Jones v. State, 13 Md. App. 677, 685, 284 A.2d 635, 639 (1971) (violent
character of victim known to defendant can create an apprehension of harm);
McMorris v. State, 58 Wisc. 2d 144, 150, 205 N.W.2d 559, 562 (1973) (past conduct of
a person "markedly affects what others may reasonably expect from him in the
future").
113. Elissa Krauss, Leslie Almond in Women's Self-Defense Cases 147, 175 (Eliz-
abeth Bochnak ed. 1981). After the trial of Leslie Almond (not her real name), one
of the jury alternates interviewed was May Glaze. She was unsympathetic toward
the plight of this particular battered woman:
I can't understand anybody living with a person that way. I question
whether he abused her the way she said, sexually. I can't picture a
man abusing her sexually that way .... But she could have packed
her bag and gone out... There must have been something that we
didn't get. He always called her a whore when he beat her up ....
Why would he say this to someone who was supposedly in love with




115. People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 130, 488 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (1985).
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V. A Supplement: BWS Testimony
A battered woman learns to distinguish between varying de-
grees of danger and violence exhibited by the batterer. 116 Testi-
mony regarding BWS can help a jury understand how, at the time
of the killing, the batterer's violence had, in the defendant's mind,
passed from "normal and tolerable" (relatively speaking) into "ab-
normal and life-threatening."117
Under the objective standard, BWS testimony should be ad-
mitted to show the objective reasonableness of the woman's per-
ception. 118 Society should not "assume" that a battered woman's
homicidal action against her husband was unreasonable. The testi-
mony can be used to show that a reasonable woman who has been
subjected to abuse in the past will know when her life is
threatened"19 and thus be justified in killing in self-defense.
The subjective view of self-defense takes the individual's per-
ceptions into account, so the use of BWS is especially relevant.
The belief that one's life was in danger does not always have to be
honest as long as the action was necessary to prevent death or seri-
ous injury.120 BWS testimony can be used to assess the reasona-
bleness of a woman's belief that her life was in danger.121
In non-confrontation situtations, the jury may question
whether the danger was truly imminent. Unless the killing was in
response to a direct attack, the jury may not see the danger as im-
minent.122 Such a perception fails to take into account that the
male may have blocked avenues of escape or made threats. The
battered woman may very well perceive the danger to be immi-
nent, even though he is no longer threatening her with a
weapon.123
116. Schneider & Jordan, supra note 98, at 44-45 n.76.
117. People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 130, 488 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (1985). A bat-
tered woman learns to distinguish between varying degrees of danger and violence,
thus acquiring "acute discriminatory powers."
118. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 193, 204, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (1984).
119. Thyfault, supra note 51, at 495.
120. See Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921). Justice Holmes' famous re-
mark: "Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted
knife." Id. at 343.
121. People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d at 130, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 362; State v. Kelly, 97
N.J. at 207 n.13, 478 A.2d at 378 n.13.
122. State v. Nunn, 356 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). The defendant stabbed
the decedent after their argument had ended and while he was unarmed. The ju-
rors were not persuaded by her testimony that the threats he had made against her
that same day put her in imminent harm. They convicted her of second degree
murder.
123. Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 1984). After 10 years of a physi-
cally-abusive marriage, decedent assaulted and threatened to kill his wife. She was
rendered unconscious. Upon waking, she went to the garage to get gasoline to
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A. Some Common Myths
Battered women often have to fight misconceived stereo-
types. Some of the myths facing battered women are that they en-
joy their beatings, purposely provoke their husbands, and are free
to leave their abusers at any time, but choose not to.124 Expert tes-
timony aids a jury in interpreting the circumstances contributing
to the defendant's behavior. The jury is then better able to assess
the reasonableness of her behavior. To a jury who may not under-
stand why the defendant would remain in a battering relationship,
BWS testimony becomes crucial to enlightening them. The court
in People v. Torres 125 allowed testimony describing BWS because
it counteracted the conclusion that the beatings and threats the de-
fendant testified to could not have been all that bad or else she
would have left long before the killing. The court said it would
help the jury understand how the defendant could reasonably fear
serious harm from her mate, yet remain with him.126
Jurors need to understand that BWS is not a mental disease
or defect releasing the defendant from criminal liability.127 Nor is
the syndrome considered an extreme emotional disturbance ren-
dering the defendant unable to distinguish between right and
wrong.128 The defense is self-defense, not insanity or diminished
capacity. The defendant seeks to introduce BWS testimony to
show that she reasonably believed the danger was imminent, and
that it was necessary to take her abuser's life in order to save her
oVn. 1 2 9
B. Use of BWS Testimony
A majority of courts either conditionally or unconditionally
hold that the study of battered woman's syndrome is a sufficiently
throw on him if he attempted another assault. When he returned home, he said he
intended to finish the job he hadn't finished the day before (killing her). He then
assaulted her and threatened her with a knife. When he left the bedroom, she tried
to lock the door. He returned, and she doused him with gasoline. She then lit a
paper and ignited him. She was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced
for a term of 10-20 years.
124. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 193, 196, 478 A.2d 364, 370 (1984) (citing Lenore
Walker, The Battered Woman 19-31 (1979)).
125. 128 Misc. 2d 129, 130, 488 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (1985).
126. Id. at 130, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
127. Id. at 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
128. Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), rev,. denied, 476 So.
2d 675 (Fla. 1985).
129. State v. Walker, 40 Wash. App. 658, 663, 700 P.2d 1168, 1173 (1985), rev. de-
nied, 104 Wash. 2d 1012 (1985).
1986]
Law and Inequality
scientifically developed area to support expert testimony. o30 When
BWS testimony is determined by the court to be relevant, an ex-
pert witness is called to describe BWS and its effects. The expert
witness will explain to the jury how the battered woman can de-
velop a psychological paralysis that makes her incapable of seeking
help.13' The expert also points out similarities between the BWS
model and the defendant.' 3 2 Finally, she will render an opinion on
whether the defendant fits the symptoms of BWS. i 33 The expert
is usually not allowed to render an opinion on the reasonableness
of the defendant's belief that her life was in danger.'3 4 This is con-
sidered the jury's question.
C. Criteria for Admissibility
While criteria for admissibility of BWS expert testimony
vary, many courts have used the three-prong test articulated in the
Dyas 135 case: (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject
matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the subject
matter must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony
could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have suffi-
cient expertise to offer the intended testimony.136
Expert testimony on BWS satisfies the first criterion because
it aids the jury in understanding the unique pressures on the bat-
tered woman. It enables jurors to recognize assumptions they
have about battered women as common myths instead of informed
knowledge.' 3 7 If the homicidal event seems too remote in time
from the beatings, 38 a court may disallow the testimony as irrele-
130. Hawthorne v. State, 470 So. 2d 770, 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citing
State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 596, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (1984)).
131. Annie E. Thar, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Wife




134. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 193, 206, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (1984); see also Ibn-Tamas
v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 632 (D.C. 1979), appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893
(D.C. 1983) (expert preempts the jury's function when speaking to "matters in
which the 'jury is just as competent as the expert to consider and weigh the evi-
dence and draw the necessary conclusions' ") (citation omitted).
135. United States v. Dyas, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S.
937 (1977).
136. Id. at 832 (quoting McCormick on Evidence § 13 (Edward W. Cleary 2d ed.
1972)).
137. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. at 206, 478 A.2d at 378.
138. State v. Moore, 72 Or. App. 454, 457, 695 P.2d 985, 987 (1985), rev. denied,
299 Or. 154, 700 P.2d 251 (1985). Defendant called a counselor at a local women's
crisis center 100 times over two months. The last call, however, was seven months
before the shooting, so the court disallowed testimony regarding specific acts of al-
leged abuse during the four-year relationship. The court expressed concern that the
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vant if the court thinks the average juror could evaluate the situa-
tion of the homicide.13 9
The second criterion is usually the hardest to meet.140 The
majority of courts use the Frye' 4 1 test to determine whether or
not a particular scientific methodology is generally accepted. State
v. Kelly 142 cites three methods of demonstrating this general ac-
ceptance. One is by introducing expert testimony describing the
general acceptance of the premises on which a particular analysis
is based.143 The second is by acknowledging authoritative scien-
tific and legal writings which indicate acceptance of the prem-
ises.'" The third method is through judicial opinions that indicate
general acceptance of the expert's premises.14 5
The lack of unanimity in the scientific community about the
causes and characteristics of domestic violence is an obstacle to sat-
isfying the Frye test. This has resulted in some courts considering
BWS testimony to be unreliable and thus inadmissible. 14 6
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not follow the "generally
accepted" explanatory theory. 47 Under Rule 702, the court must
determine whether the proposed testimony is relevant and
whether it will assist the trier of fact. Cross-examination should
be used to attack the testimony, and the jury will then determine
the weight it should be given.148
New York has a two-fold test for determining admissibil-
ity:149 "(1) does the opinion testimony 'depend upon professional
or scientific knowledge or skill not within the range of ordinary
training or intelligence' and (2) is the state of the pertinent art or
proceeding was "degenerating into a trial of the defendant's and the victim's rela-
tionship." 72 Or. App. at 457, 695 P.2d at 987.
139. State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981). The
court ruled the subject of battered woman syndrome was within the understanding
of the jury, and not sufficiently developed as a matter of commonly accepted scien-
tific knowledge to warrant testimony under the guise of expertise. The court found
that the prejudicial impact of allowing expert testimony on BWS would outweigh
its probative value, and that it was irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of
whether or not the defendant had acted in self-defense. Id.
140. M. Julianne Leary, A Woman, A Horse, A Hickory Tree: The Development
of Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in Homicide Cases, 53
UMKC L. Rev. 386, 400 (1985).
141. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
142. 97 N.J. 178, 210, 478 A.2d 364, 380 (1984).
143. Id. (citing State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 521, 443 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1982)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. State v. Hawthorne, No. 77-235C (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 14, 1982) (Order on De-
fendant's Suggestion of Admissibility of Testimony of Lenore Walker, Ed.D).
147. Thyfault, supra note 51, at 508.
148. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
149. People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 130, 488 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (1985).
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scientific knowledge sufficiently developed to permit a reasonable
opinion to be asserted even by an expert." The New York Torres
court held that BWS "has indeed passed beyond the experimental
stage and gained a substantial enough scientific acceptance to war-
rant admissibility." 15 0 Even though a majority of courts find BWS
sufficiently credible to support an expert opinion, some courts are
still skeptical1 51 and may allow non-expert witnesses to impeach a
methodology in a field beyond their expertise.152
150. Id at 134; 488 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
151. Cf. State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1985) The decedent had
held an open knife to defendant's throat, threatened to cut her head off, and kicked
her in the back. He forced her at knifepoint to engage in sexual relations, made
her lie next to him in bed and told her to "count every second .... I want you to
wonder what minute I'm going to cut your throat." Id. at 662-63. The defendant,
terrified of being killed, slipped her gun from beneath the mattress and as she
eased out of bed in an attempt to escape, she turned and saw the decedent raising
up with a clenched fist. She then fired the fatal shot. The court disallowed testi-
mony on BWS because she had failed to plead "not guilty and not guilty by reason
of insanity." It rejected the use of evidence to show state of mind. Id. at 665.
152. Hawthorne v. State, 470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter
Hawthorne IIl], illustrates the confusion courts have in the proper application of
BWS testimony. Joyce Bernice Hawthorne was convicted of first degree murder in
1979. On her first appeal (Hawthorne 1), the appellate court reversed and remanded,
holding, inter alia, that "[t]estimony as to the deceased's prior threats and acts of
violence toward the defendant, her children, and third persons was improperly dis-
allowed." Hawthorne v. State, 377 So. 2d 780, 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) [herein-
after Hawthorne 1]. On remand the testimony was introduced, and she was
convicted of second-degree murder.
On the second appeal in 1982, the appellate court held, inter alia, that testi-
mony of a clinical psychologist on BWS should have been admitted below so the
case was reversed and remanded. Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982). On remand, the trial court refused to admit testimony of the expert
witness on BWS. 470 So. 2d 770, 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter Haw-
thorne III]. Defendant was convicted of manslaughter.
On the third appeal (Hawthorne III) in 1985, the appellate court said the re-
fusal to admit the expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion under the cir-
cumstances, but reversed and remanded on other grounds.
At trial, the defendant testified that the first thing she remembered after firing
the shotgun was calling the sheriff's department for an ambulance. The prosecutor
tried to impeach this testimony by asking her if she had actually called her lawyer
first. The trial court allowed the prosecutor's question, but the appellate court held
this to be reversible error since the source of the impeachment was an illegally ob-
tained statement. The Hawthorne II court conditioned the admissibility of the ex-
pert testimony on the trial court's determination that the expert, Dr. Lenore
Walker, was qualified and that the syndrome was found to be sufficiently developed
to support an expert opinion.
Dr. Walker is one of the ten best known professionals in the area of BWS. She
is a licensed psychologist in private practice in Denver, Colorado. She has an Ed.D.
from Rutgers and has received training in community psychology at Harvard Uni-
versity. She has been awarded a Diplomate in Clinical Psychology from the Ameri-
can Board of Professional Psychology. She has taught psychology at the college
level and has done studies on battered women.
The Hawthorne III court found that, because the trial court has broad discre-
tion in determining the range of subjects on which an expert could testify, only a
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Improper impeachment of expert witnesses can be avoided by
heeding the advice the Washington, D.C. court gave in Ibn-Tamas
v. United States: "[S]atisfaction of the third Dyas criterion [the
general acceptance standard] begins-and ends-with a determina-
tion of whether there is general acceptance of a particular scien-
tific methodology, not an acceptance, beyond that, of a particular
study's results based on that methodology."53 Accordingly, Ms.
Hawthorne argued, and commentators agree with the Tbn-Tamas
court, that if the methods are acceptable, then different conclu-
sions, interpretations, and criticisms of the findings should go to
the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility. 154
clear showing of error would cause the decision to be overturned on appeal. Haw-
thorne III, 470 So. 2d at 773.
On the second remand, the trial court focused mainly on the qualifications of
Dr. Walker. The trial court held hearings for over three days to determine the ade-
quacy of Dr. Walker's qualifications as an expert witness, and to determine the ex-
tent of acceptance of her methodology. While the court was supposed to determine
whether or not the methods used by Dr. Walker had gained general acceptance in
the field, it rejected Dr. Walker as an expert witness because her findings were not
generally accepted. Id at 773. The impeaching witnesses provided by the state
were critical of Dr. Walker's methodology. Id at 777 (Ervin, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Dr. Marc Gertz, an associate professor of criminology at
Florida State University, criticized Dr. Walker's methodology as "biased, over gen-
eralized and unreliable." Dr. William Glen Doerner, also an associate professor of
criminology at Florida State University (and reserve police officer for the Tallahas-
see Police Department) criticized Walker's methods as lacking a control group of
non-battered women whose characteristics could be compared with those of bat-
tered women. Neither of the witnesses, however, were themselves experts in the
field of clinical psychology nor were they familiar with testing techniques com-
monly used in that field. Nonetheless, the trial court found that: "The depth of
study in this field has not yet reached the point where an expert witness can give
testimony with any degree of assurance that the state of the art will support an ex-
pert opinion." Id at 773. Ironically, both sides agreed that Dr. Walker was emi-
nently qualified as a BWS expert and that the syndrome was a subject sufficiently
developed and able to support an expert opinion. Id. at 774. The court, however,
determined that the criticism leveled against Dr. Walker's study outweighed her
qualifications.
Dicta in Hawthorne III indicated that on remand, the defendant would not be
precluded from re-offering Dr. Walker or any other witness as an expert on the
subject:
Our determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
failing to permit Dr. Walker to testify as an expert witness does not, of
course, preclude the defense on retrial to reoffer this witness or any
other witness as an expert on this subject. Again, the trial court has
the discretion to determine the qualifications of the expert and
whether the subject can support an expert's opinion.
Id. at 774. This may not, however, help the defendant because she will need to pro-
duce an expert whose methodology and particular test results are generally
accepted.
153. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 638 (D.C. 1979), appeal after re-
mand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983).
154. Hawthorne III, 470 So. 2d at 778 (Ervin, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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Inconsistency in the law regarding the admission of BWS tes-
timony places battered women facing homicide charges at the
mercy of the particular jurisdiction in which they are prosecuted.
One court may consider a witness to be an expert, while another
court considers the same witness to be unqualified. 5 5 While some
appellate courts will reverse the trial court if BWS testimony was
not admitted, this will only happen if the trial court did not rule
on whether the proposed expert was adequately qualified. The
trial court's broad discretion to determine whether an expert wit-
ness will be allowed to testify is a ruling rarely reversed on
appeal.156
Courts should be uniform in the admissibility of BWS testi-
mony. Uniformity can only be accomplished if courts agree on the
qualifications necessary to classify a witness as an expert. Admit-
ting BWS testimony does not guarantee an acquittal, nor should it.
Not every killing by a battered woman may be justified. Even if
BWS testimony were uniformly admissible, the trial court would
still have to determine its relevancy to the particular case at hand.
It would also retain its discretion in determining whether a pro-
spective witness was sufficiently qualified to testify regarding
BWS. As the courts interpret BWS now, the defendant not only
has to show that she killed in self-defense, but also prove that she
is truly a battered woman who has all the symptoms of BWS. 1 7
This judicial view has caused the prosecution to introduce evidence
to rebut the testimony that the defendant was suffering from the
syndrome.158 This is a trap for the unwary because it does not ad-
dress the true issue at trial-whether the defendant killed in self-
defense. She is not on trial because of her status; she is on trial
because of her actions.
155. At the time the Hawthorne trial court excluded Dr. Walker's testimony be-
cause it found that she was not "qualified," her testimony had only been excluded
four times in 35 previous cases involving battered women. 470 So. 2d at 776.
156. People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 134, 488 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 (1985) (citing
People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63, 74, 349 N.Y.S.2d 657, 665, 304 N.E.2d 358, 364
(1973)); Hawthorne III, 470 So. 2d at 773.
157. Crocker, supra note 9, at 145.
158. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 206, 478 A.2d 364, 375 (1984). The prosecutor ar-
gued that the decedent would probably tell a different story than the defendant. In
an attempt to impeach, prosecution questioned her about her use of alcohol, drugs,
and about her premarital sexual conduct. The State in closing arguments at-
tempted to minimize the past beatings:
I'm not going to say they happened or they didn't happen, but life isn't
pretty. Life is not a bowl of cherries. We each and every person who
takes a breath has problems. Defense counsel says bruised and bat-
tered. Is there any one of us who hasn't been battered by life in some
manner or means?
Id. at 208, 478 A.2d at 378.
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The battered woman may face conviction if the jury is al-
lowed to be side-tracked from the issue of whether she killed in
self-defense to whether she displayed all the symptoms of BWS.159
Thus, if the woman had a job1 0 or ever fought back x1i or had been
separated from her batterer only to be later reunited,16 2 the prose-
cution may argue that she was not truly suffering from battered
woman's syndrome. However, this analysis erroneously casts BWS
as a diminished capacity or insanity defense which must be proved
or disproved.163 The true issue is whether her status as a battered
woman caused her to reasonably believe her life was in danger,
and that she needed to kill to preserve it.
VI. The Tort: Wrongful Death
Regardless of the outcome of the criminal trial, the battered
woman can still be subject to a civil suit for wrongful death. If the
battered woman was married to the man she killed, then her lia-
bility will depend on the provisions of the wrongful death statute
and whether the jurisdiction upholds the doctrine of interspousal
tort immunity. Although each state has its own wrongful death
statute whose provisions vary, most statutes allow an action:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful
act, neglect or default ... as would if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and re-
cover damages in respect thereof . . . although the death may
have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law
to a felony.1 6 4
159. State v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 190, 685 P.2d 564, 567 (1984). Prosecution
produced neighbors who testified that: defendant had threatened them, was ver-
bally abusive and had threatened to injure him; she had pounded on the back door
of her home with a shovel when Mr. Kelly was inside and had locked her out. The
evidence was used to rebut the "isolation" and "learned helplessness" characteris-
tics of a battered woman.
160. State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1266 (Me. 1983) (testimony that defendant's
boyfriend did not have a steady job and therefore defendant's reason for staying
with him was not economic dependence); see also Borders v. State, 433 So. 2d 1325
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (defendant was provider for the household).
161. Mullis v. State, 248 Ga. 338, 282 S.E.2d 334 (1981) (defendant repeatedly de-
fended herself against husband's physical attacks); Anaya, 456 A.2d at 1266 (defend-
ant once stabbed boyfriend in back during a fight in which he had kicked her, held
a knife to her throat, and threatened to kill her); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374,
1375 (Wyo. 1981) (defendant once threatened husband with shovel-his response
was to beat her about the head, neck and shoulders with a pair of work boots).
162. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. at 205-06, 478 A.2d at 369. During the cross-examina-
tion of Ms. Kelly, the prosecutor referred to Mr. Kelly's temporarily leaving the
marital home by repeatedly asking, "You wanted him back, didn't you?" Id. at 212,
478 A.2d 377.
163. See State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
164. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-906 (1947); see also Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 70 § 1 (Smith-
Hurd 1959); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18A § 2-804 (1964); Md. Ann. Code art. 3 § 902
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Others may add the words "omission" or "negligence."165 New
Hampshire allows an action for death "caused by the injury com-
plained of."166 Delaware 167 and Pennsylvania168 allow an action if
unlawful violence or negligence caused the death. Kentucky 16 9
and Georgia170 are the only states with provisions specifically re-
lating to deaths caused by homicide. Kentucky explicitly states
that self-defense is a release from liability.171
A. Who May Sue in Wrongful Death Actions
A wrongful death action can only be brought by and in the
name of the person designated by statute.172 Beneficiaries may not
(1984); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2972 (West 1968); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-809
(1943); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-1 (1978); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-2 (Supp. 1983); N.D.
Cent. Code § 32-21-01 (1978); R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-7-1 (1985); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-51-
10 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 21-5-1 (1979); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14
§ 1491 (1974); Va. Code § 8.01-50 (1984); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.20.010 (1962).
Other statutes include first and second degree murder or manslaughter: Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-612 (1982); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2125.01 (Page 1976); W. Va.
Code § 55-5-7-5 (1966); Wyo. Stat. § 1-38-101 (1977); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:31-1 (1985)
(crime).
The following statutes allow an action for "wrongful act, neglect, or default":
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-202 (1973); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2701 (1981); Hawaii Rev.
Stat. § 663-3 (1976); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.080 (Vernon 1953); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.085
(1986); N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts § 5.41 (McKinney 1981); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.03
(West 1983).
The following statutes allow an action only for "wrongful act, neglect": Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 377 (1973); Idaho Code § 5-311 (1979); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-513
(1980); Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (1977).
Other statutes have unique characterizations of those acts allowing the wrong-
ful death action: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-555 (West 1960) (party legally at fault);
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.16 (West 1964) (wrongful or negligent act, default, breach of
contract or warranty of any party); Iowa Code Ann. § 613.15 (West 1946) (wrongful
or negligent injury or death); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315 (West 1979) ("caused by
offense or quasi-offense"); Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-103 (1980) (tortious or wrongful
act causing death).
165. Ala. Code § 6-5-410 (1977) (omission, negligence); Alaska Stat. § 09.55.580
(1978) (omission); Ind. Code § 34-1-1-2 (1973) (omission); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60.1901
(1983) (omission); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.130(1) (1970) (willful negligence, gross negli-
gence); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229, § 2 (1986) (negligence, willful, wanton or
reckless act, gross negligence); Minn. Stat. § 573.02 (1984) (omission); Miss. Code
Ann. § 11-7-13 (1972) (omission, negligence); Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 1053 (West 1961)
(omission); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.020 (1981) (omission).
166. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 556.12 (1974).
167. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 § 3704 (1975).
168. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8301 (1982).
169. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.130 (1970).
170. Ga. Code § 51-4-2 (1982).
171. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.150 (1970). The Kentucky wrongful death statute
originated from an 1851 statute providing for recovery in favor of the widow and
minor child of one killed in a duel. The defendants were the "surviving principal,
the seconds, and all others aiding or promoting the duel." Moore v. Citizens Bank
of Pikeville, 420 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Ky. 1967).
172. Stuart Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death § 5.24, 6.46 (2d ed. 1975).
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personally sue where the right of action is given to the personal
representative of the deceased for the beneficiaries.173 A personal
representative is a person appointed by the court with fiduciary
duties to administer the decedent's estate. In a majority of the
states, the personal representative is the person designated to
bring the action.174 Ten other state statutes designate other per-
sons for that duty.175
B. Statutory Immunity
In three states, the surviving spouse is immune from suit ac-
cording to the provisions of the wrongful death statute. In Colo-
rado, where interspousal tort immunity has been abolished, if the
spouse fails to file suit within a year, the children or their descend-
ants are allowed to sue.176 If the children are minors, however,
they would be unlikely to bring a cause of action against the
mother unless a guardian were appointed for them to litigate on
their behalf. The statutes provide that next-of-kin can sue if no
one else is entitled to bring the action.177 Although the wife is en-
titled to sue, she simply would not do so because then she would
be both plaintiff and defendant.s78
In Georgia, only the surviving spouse can sue.179 Since Geor-
173. Id, at 215.
174. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 70 § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959); N.Y. Est. Powers &
Trusts § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1981).
175. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-201 (1973) (spouse, heirs); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10
§ 3704 (1975) (spouse, personal representative); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-4-2 (1982)
(spouse, children); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315 (West 1979) (spouse, children); N.D.
Cent. Code tit. 32-21-03 (1976) (spouse, children, mother, father, personal represen-
tative); Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-107 (1980) (spouse, children, personal representa-
tive, next of kin; Md. Ann. Code tit. 3 § 904 (1973) (spouse, parents, children);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 573.02 (West 1984) (trustee); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.080 (1953)
(spouse, if none, then children, if none, then parents, if none, then administrator or
executor); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A: 31-2 (1952) (administrator ad prosequendum if died
intestate, and executor or administrator if died testate).
176. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-201(b) (1973); Niven v. Falkenburg, 553 F. Supp. 1021
(D. Colo. 1983) (children given right only if no surviving spouse).
177. Id.
178. For a similar case where the husband claimed interspousal tort immunity as
a defense because, if sued, he would be both the plaintiff and the defendant, see
Moore v. Citizens Bank of Pikeville, 420 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Ky. 1967). In Moore, the
defendant argued that absent a conviction, he would be entitled to inherit his wife's
(the decedent's) estate. Thus any recovery in a wrongful death action would ulti-
mately benefit him. The Kentucky court said such an action was precluded if no
children were involved. Another court arrived at the opposite result, however, in
Korman v. Carpenter, 216 Va. 86, 216 S.E.2d 195 (1975) where a childless spouse was
held to be subject to suit.
179. Ga. Code Ann. § 105-1302 (1976); Watkins v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 980
(S.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd 587 F.2d (2d Cir. 1979); Lambert v. Allen, 146 Ga. App. 617,
619, 247 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1978).
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gia still retains interspousal tort immunity, battered wives in Geor-
gia are thoroughly protected from a wrongful death action. 8 0
In Louisiana, the surviving spouse and children of the de-
ceased are both given the right to sue.' 8 ' This presents the same
situation as in Colorado. A surviving parent of the decedent would
be allowed to sue only if the decedent had left no surviving spouse
or child. Where a surviving spouse is left, the doctrine of inter-
spousal tort immunity would protect her from liability.1 82
C. aassification of Wrongful Death Statutes
A legislature's classification of the wrongful death statute de-
termines how a court will construe it. In a majority of states, a
wrongful death action is considered a new cause of action and is
not derived from the decedent's personal injury claim.183 Courts
have construed wrongful death statute provisions as reaching the
tortious act itself rather than the person committing the tort. 8 4
Thus, because interspousal immunity is personal and does not ad-
here to the tort itself, it will not bar a wrongful death action under
this interpretation. 8 5
Other jurisdictions have considered the wrongful death action
to be a continuation of the decedent's personal injury action, and
have classified the wrongful death statute as a survival statute. 8 6
The court must then determine whether the decedent would have
been able to sue his wife had he been alive. Courts have ruled that
under this classification of a wrongful death statute, an action for
the death of one spouse, by or on behalf of beneficiaries other than
the "wrongdoing" spouse, will be barred by the doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity.18 7
D. Interspousal Tort Immunity: Current Legal Status
In the intentional tort context, the doctrine of interspousal
180. See Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715, 261 S.E.2d 610 (1979) (interspousal tort im-
munity applies to wrongful death actions).
181. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315, subd. 1109, 1124 (1979); see also Lewis v. Allis-
Chalmers Corp., 615 F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1980).
182. Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cus. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122
(1965). Oddly enough, because of conflicting statutes, La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315
and La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:291, the spouse is given a cause of action, but has no
remedy to enforce it.
183. Speiser, supra note 172, at 638.
184. See Prem v. Cox, 20 Ohio St. 3d 149, 443 N.E.2d 511 (1983); In re Pickens v.
Pickens, 255 Ind. 119, 263 N.E.2d 151 (1970).
185. 255 Ind. 119, 263 N.E.2d 151.
186. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-555 (West 1958) as construed by Hinde
v. Butler, 35 Conn. Supp. 292, 408 A.2d 668 (1979).
187. Speiser, supra note 172, at 639 n.99.
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tort immunity has been severely criticized.' 8 8 One court has noted
the doctrine's inconsistent application, limited utility, and ques-
tionable efficacy as a legal principle.18 9 Georgiai90, Hawaii' 9 ' and
Louisiana' 92 have statutes upholding the immunity. These stat-
utes, however, protect a woman only if she is considered the
"spouse" of the deceased. In one state where interspousal tort im-
munity is generally favored, the courts may have decided that the
policy considerations favoring immunity are no longer valid when
one spouse is dead, and the interspousal tort immunity has not
been applied to wrongful death actions.' 93 A growing number of
courts now rule that an action for the death of one spouse can be
maintained against the other spouse, or his or her estate, even
though immunity existed during life.J
9 4
The irony of interspousal tort immunity is that for years it
has worked against battered wives. Since they were denied tort ac-
tions against their abusive husbands, they were left with no rem-
edy except for criminal sanctions or divorce. Abrogation of the
immunity has allowed battered wives a redress for the abuse their
battering husband has inflicted on them. In the case of battered
wives who kill their husbands, however, interspousal tort immu-
nity was the only insulation against a civil wrongful death ac-
tion.' 95 Presently, forty-two states have abrogated the doctrine.1
96
188. See generally Speiser, supra note 172, at 640-44 (citing Bogen v. Bogen, 219
N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941)):
Whether a man has laid open his wife's head with a bludgeon, put out
her eye, broken her arm, poisoned her body, he is not exempt from
liability to her on the ground that he vowed at the alter [sic] to 'love,
cherish, and protect her.' We have progressed that far in civilization
and justice.
219 N.C. at 53, 12 S.E.2d at 651.
189. Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 542, 388 A.2d 951, 955 (1978).
190. Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-9 (1933).
191. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 573-5 (1955).
192. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:291 (1980).
193. Florida adheres to interspousal tort immunity for tort actions, but the im-
munity does not apply to wrongful death actions. See Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20 (Fla.
1982) (interspousal tort immunity applies in tort actions); Dressler v. Tubbs, 435 So.
2d 792 (Fla. 1983) (wife's estate sues husband's estate to collect insurance for death
caused by negligent operation of an airplane which crashed and killed both parties).
194. Speiser, supra note 172, at 640.
195. Nine states still retain the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. See, e.g.,
Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161 (Del. 1979); Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla.
1979); Robeson v. Int'l Indemnity Co., 248 Ga. 306, 282 S.E.2d 896 (1981); Peters v.
Peters, 634 P.2d 586 (Haw. 1981); Williams v. Williams, 439 N.E.2d 1058 (Ill. 1982);
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:291 (1980); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal,
254 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1971); Renfrow v. Gojohn, 600 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980);
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. v. Leary, 544 P.2d 444 (Mont. 1975); McKinney v.
McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943).
196. For an excellent, although slightly outdated discussion of the status of the
immunity, see Boblitz v. Boblitz, 462 A.2d 506, 522 app. A (Md. 1983). Since that
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For these women, the abrogation of interspousal tort immunity
has created liability.
E. On Trial Again
In the majority of jurisdictions, a battered wife will not be
protected by the provisions of a wrongful death statute or inter-
spousal tort immunity. The issue of civil liability for battered
wives has only recently become a serious threat. The abrogation of
interspousal tort immunity has exposed battered wives to liability
from which they were previously exempt. Historically, wives who
killed their husbands were routinely convicted and spent the rest
of their lives in jail or the insane asylum.197 Today, with the in-
creasing awareness of the plight of battered women and the admis-
sibility of testimony of battered woman's syndrome, these women
have a better chance for acquittal or conviction with a short or sus-
pended sentence. Thus, a battered wife who kills her husband in
self-defense has a good chance of facing two trials--one where she
faces loss of liberty and another where she faces loss of everything
else she owns.
F. Self-Defense: Burden of Proof Problems
If the battered woman is acquitted in a criminal trial, she will
not likely be able to plead collateral estoppel on the issue of self-
defense in a subsequent civil trial.198 An acquittal may merely sig-
nify the state's failure to meet the higher standard of "proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt" required for a conviction.1 99 The
preponderance of the evidence standard in a wrongful death action
could produce a different result.200
Proving self-defense transforms an otherwise wrongful act
into a justified and thus rightful act. While it would seem that the
law of self-defense would be the same in both civil and criminal
actions, procedural differences and a potential shift in the burden
of proof belie the similarity.201 While tort cases examining the
decision the following states have abrogated the immunity: Jones v. Pledger, 363
F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Stevens v. Stevens, 231 Kan. 726, 647 P.2d 1346 (1982);
Prem v. Cox, 20 Ohio St. 3d 149, 443 N.E.2d 511 (1983); Landers v. Landers, 216 A.2d
183 (Or. 1966); Luna v. Clayton, 655 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. 1983).
197. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
198. State Mut. Life Assurance v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 1027, 1036 (Okla. 1985)
("An acquittal on a criminal charge is never a bar-not even between the govern-
ment and the accused-to a civil action arising out of the same facts on which the
criminal proceeding was based.").
199. Id. at 1033.
200. Id.
201. In a criminal case, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the
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substantive law of self-defense are few,20 2 Prosser says tort rules
appear to be completely identical with those of criminal law.203
Case law, however, sometimes contradicts this.
In a criminal case, self-defense is a complete defense justify-
ing the act of homicide.20 4 The only difference between criminal
and civil actions is the different level of proof required.205
Whether self-defense is classified as either an excuse or a justifica-
tion in a criminal action is important in determining how self-de-
fense will be viewed in a wrongful death action. An excuse
acknowledges the criminal nature of the conduct, but excuses it
because the person believed circumstances existed vindicating her
conduct when, in fact, they did not.206 Justification, on the other
hand, requires a determination that certain circumstances actually
existed which made proper and legal what would otherwise be
criminal conduct.207 Self-defense is such a justification. When an
act is justified, no liability--civil or criminal-should attach.208
When the defendant in a criminal homicide case introduces
evidence of self-defense, the burden shifts to the prosecution to
disprove the defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.209
In a wrongful death action, however, courts disagree as to who has
the burden of proof regarding self-defense. Stuart Speiser, a lead-
ing authority on wrongful death law, says that when the plaintiff's
evidence does not have a built-in defense, the general rule is that
the defendant has the burden of justifying or excusing her ac-
tions.210 This would cast the burden of proving self-defense on the
defendant.
In Ambrose v. Wheatley,211 a wrongful death action against
state troopers for the shooting of the decedent, the court stated
that the plaintiff does not have to disprove all possible justifying
elements of the crime charged. If the defendant produces substantial evidence to
put self-defense in issue, then the prosecution has the burden of disproving self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. LaFave & Scott, supra note 99, at 50 n.40.
202. See Harris v. Hodges, 291 S.E.2d 346, 347 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
203. Id., citing William Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 19, 108 n.12 (4th
ed. 1971).
204. LaFave & Scott, supra note 99, at 391.
205. Id.
206. Kris H. Davick, Criminal Law--Sef-Defense--Jury Instructions Given on
Subjective Standard of Reasonableness in Self-Defense do not Require a Speciftc In-
struction on Battered Woman's Syndrome, 60 N.D.L. Rev. 141, 145 (1981).
207. Id.
208. Johnson v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 208 F.2d 633, 634 (3d Cir. 1953) (citing Re-
statement of Torts § 65 (1934)).
209. State v. Walker, 40 Wash. App. 658, 661, 700 P.2d 1168, 1171 (1985) (citing
State v. Acosta, 101 Wash. 2d 612, 683 P.2d 1069 (1984).
210. Speiser, supra note 172, at 292.
211. 321 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Del. 1971).
1986]
Law and Inequality
circumstances, such as self-defense, unavoidable accident, or privi-
leged use of force in an arrest.2 1 2 The court thus rejected the pre-
sumption that an intentional killing is justifiable,213 and reasoned
that the justification must be proved by the party asserting it.214 A
person asserting self-defense as an affirmative defense acknowl-
edges the existence of prima facie liability, but if self-defense is
proved, avoids any liability.2' 5
In recent cases involving self-defense in wrongful death ac-
tions, however, the courts have considered self-defense an inferen-
tial rebuttal issue.2 16 An inferential rebuttal issue disproves the
existence of an essential element submitted in another issue.217
The plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving that the kill-
ing of the deceased was "wrongful." 218 If the plaintiff proves an
intentional killing, then the burden of showing the death was
wrongful is met. But, if the defendant raises an issue of justifica-
tion, such as self-defense, then the plaintiff has the burden of
proof to overcome by a preponderance of the evidence the defense
of self-defense.2' 9 If the plaintiff cannot, then the plaintiff has
failed to prove the death was wrongful.220 The inferential rebuttal
characterization represents the better-reasoned view. To prevail
on a wrongful death cause of action, the plaintiff should be re-
quired to prove all the elements of the tort. Since the main ele-
ment of this tort is that the death be "wrongful," the mere fact
that the killing was intentional should not be enough to prove this
element, especially if the defendant killed in self-defense. Adopt-
ing the affirmative defense characterization does not take into ac-
count the nature of self-defense. Compare self-defense to one of
the traditional affirmative defenses such as contributory negli-
gence. Contributory negligence must be proved by the defendant
in order to deny the plaintiff recovery. Contributory negligence,
212. Id. at 1224.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Foster v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 548 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977),
writ ref'd n.r.e. (Cadena, J., dissenting).
216. Liveoak v. Ingham, 644 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982), writ. ref'd
nr.e. (citing Norris v. Branham, 557 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)).
217. Cooper v. Boyar, 567 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), writ ref'd rnr.e.
(citing Wirtz v. Orr, 533 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)).
218. Cooper v. Boyar, 567 S.W.2d at 559 (citing Grieger v. Vega, 153 Tex. 498, 271
S.W.2d 85 (1954)). Accord Floyd v. Franklin, 251 Ala. 15, 36 So. 2d 234 (1948) (suit
by widow against her husband's mother who claimed the estate; burden was on the
administrator to prove that the killing was felonious).
219. Bradford v. Fort Worth Transit Co., 450 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tex. 1970), writ
ref'd n.r.e. (citing Grieger v. Vega, 153 Tex. 498, 271 S.W.2d 85 (1954)).
220. Liveoak v. Ingham, 644 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. App. 1982) (citing Bradford v.
Fort Worth Transit Co., 450 S.W.2d 919, 922 (1970)).
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however, is not a justification for the action. When a defendant
pleads contributory negligence, fault may be conceded, but the
plaintiff is denied recovery because the plaintiff is also at fault. In
self-defense, however, the defendant's fault is never conceded.
The defendant's action is not an excuse, but rather a justification
for the killing. A justified killing does not result in a "wrongful"
death. Accordingly, it is erroneous to characterize self-defense in a
civil action as an affirmative defense.
The classification of self-defense affects the battered woman's
case in the following ways: if self-defense is characterized as an af-
firmative defense to be proven by the defendant, then admission of
BWS testimony is especially crucial. While a jury may be hesitant
to incarcerate a battered woman, it may not be as reluctant to
award civil damages. To prove self-defense, the battered woman
would use BWS testimony in the same way as in a criminal trial.
With the burden of proof placed on the defendant, use of BWS is
just as crucial in a civil case as in a criminal one.
When the defense of self-defense is considered an inferential
rebuttal issue, the burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff. This
is beneficial to the battered woman since the plaintiff will have to
disprove the use of self-defense. Since the preponderance of the
evidence standard is a lower burden of proof, however, the bat-
tered woman faces a greater likelihood of liability than in a crimi-
nal trial. Testimony regarding BWS can be used to add credibility
to her self-defense claim. BWS testimony is also necessary to re-
but evidence the plaintiff may introduce to deny that the woman
has BWS, and to show that her fear for her life was reasonable.
VII. Conclusion
Testimony on BWS has attained the professional acceptance
and scientific reliability required to qualify as expert opinion. Ac-
cordingly, it should be admissible in both criminal and civil trials
to support a self-defense claim. Uniformity is needed in determin-
ing whether or not a witness is qualified to be an expert. A lack of
uniformity has deprived battered women of crucial testimony.
While trial courts need discretion in this area, they should closely
scrutinize whether the expert testimony is relevant to the particu-
lar defendant. While the trial court needs to determine whether a
witness is qualified to testify as an expert, judicial notice should be
taken of other cases where a particular expert has been accepted.
Unlike criminal actions where the standards are fairly uni-
form, wrongful death statutes vary greatly from state to state.
Both self-defense standards and the burdens of proof differ.
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Whether the state has abrogated the doctrine of interspousal tort
immunity and how the state applies the doctrine in wrongful death
actions also determine whether an action can be maintained.
The battered wife's liability is determined by the provisions
of the particular wrongful death statutes whose damage provisions
vary greatly. Because criminal liability does not preclude a civil
action, the battered wife could find herself not only in jail, but to-
tally without assets when she is finally released. If the conviction
results in a suspended sentence, the wife will have paid a high
price for freedom from a life of abuse.
